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Abstract 
YASMINE ELISABETH ALLEN: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 101: 
REGULATORY IMPACT IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
(under the direction of Bonnie Van Ness) 
High frequency trading has impacted the American and European financial markets 
through its advanced algorithms, rapid speed, and preferential treatment from purchasing 
information and co-location from exchanges. High frequency trading alone is not 
harmful, but without proper regulations it can hurt the financial markets. In this thesis, I 
researched implemented regulations, the consequences of those regulations, and pending 
new regulations. To gather information, I studied relevant research on the topic, including 
numerous academic articles and books to get a broader view of the issues. Through my 
research, I have found that previous regulations implemented by American and European 
regulatory agencies have benefitted high frequency trading firms, and that exchanges, 
through selling information via co-location, have created an environment that benefits 
high frequency traders.  High frequency trading firms are affecting the market in a 
negative way by providing a false sense of liquidity while acting as a market makers and 
by purchasing preferential information and access to the financial markets. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The market is like a shattered vase that is now held together with glue called 
high frequency trading (HFT), and that glue is weak” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012, p. 8). 
Deeply-rooted in the U.S and European markets is a predator. That predator is 
eating from the average person’s hard earned money. That predator dominated more than 
half of the U.S market in 2009 and made over $5 billions in earnings (Serbera & 
Paumard, 2016). This predator is called high frequency trading. High frequency trading is 
high speed trading through the use of algorithms to earn advantages in the financial 
markets based on speed. High frequency traders transact in milliseconds and nanoseconds 
using advanced computer systems and co-location. 
 High frequency trading in itself is neither good nor bad, but is a part of the 
technological advances that have developed during the 20 and 21st centuries. The 
technology behind high frequency trading is not unique to the stock market, technological 
advances are happening in all industries across the world. With new technology comes 
new guidelines that one has to follow for the markets to function properly. High 
frequency traders must, as Ted Kaufman explains in Broken Markets (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 
2012), operate within a framework. Appropriate framework is where high frequency 
trading is lacking and where the correct regulations must be implemented to help set 
things straight. New innovations and technological advances are detrimental to future 
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growth and development (Bréhier, 2013). High frequency trading is the result of these 
new innovations mixed with legislative actions that allowed high frequency trading firms 
to become the massive trading machines they are today. 
According to Patterson (2012) in August 2008 around 90 percent or more of the 
orders that entered the market were canceled, and in the time frame, from 2009-2011, 60 
percent of orders were canceled within one second (Gregoriou, 2015). The speed at 
which high frequency traders entered and canceled orders was automated and could not 
be accomplished or even noticed by humans. The problem might not lie in the fact that 
computers trade fast and with accuracy (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014), but the fact that 
the US exchange system is not built for this type of trading (Patterson). The US stock 
market had become a complex system but was still operating on a simple platform.  
High frequency trading is a huge source of profits. High frequency trading firms 
rarely hold positions overnight and work more as market makers than traders (Patterson, 
2012). High frequency trading firms are different from traditional market makers in that 
they are not regulated and registered as market makers, they operate freely and without 
most traders’ knowledge (Lewis, 2014). That high frequency trading is complex and hard 
to understand is something on which most everyone who has heard about it agrees. In this 
thesis I will discuss how high frequency trading affects the legal and economic realms in 
America and Europe. From a legal perspective, the government and regulatory authorities 
have to decide which laws to implement to ensure safe and efficient markets. As 
discussed later in this thesis, regulations can also hurt the market if not implemented 
correctly. High frequency trading affects the economy of a country through how it affects 
the trust of the everyday investor.
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CHAPTER II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
  Technological advancement with high frequency trading started back in the 
1990’s (Patterson, 2012) and has continued growing and developing in the stock market 
since then. Wall Street is no longer what it was in the 80’s. Trading floors hardly exist 
anymore because the human capacity to trade is no longer sufficient in the technological 
driven world we live in today. High frequency traders trade through computer algorithms 
instead of specialists. Dating back to 1997 when IBM’s robot Deep Blue beat the world 
chess champion in chess (International Business Machines Corporation [IBM]), we have 
known that computers can out speed and outsmart the human brain in certain tasks. In the 
case of high frequency trading, computers have done just that. High frequency trading 
firms transact at a speed much faster than a human eye can blink and they are trading 
faster than a regular investor with a computer with high-speed Internet could ever 
achieve. According to Gregoriou (2015) high frequency trading is “the use of propriety 
trading algorithms which are executed with the help of superfast computers to make a 
profit on the basis of informational speed advantage measured in milliseconds; rapid 
entry and exit from the order stream may fetch a small fractional profit but the large 
volume turns that into substantial sums for the HF traders.” (p. 113) 
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A. U.S. STOCK MARKET HISTORY 
In 1792, 24 brokers came together outside 68 Wall Street in New York to sign the 
Buttonwood Agreement to begin trading securities (The New York Stock Exchange 
[NYSE]). Since then, the NYSE has been an ever evolving market. Many more 
exchanges have come into existence. Some of them, like BATS, started in 2005 (Bats 
Exchange), serve as alternatives to the more traditional exchanges, such as the NYSE and 
NASDAQ.  
 Although the theoretical purpose of US Stock markets, to efficiently bring 
together buyers and sellers, has not changed, the day-to-day working reality has changed 
since the opening of NYSE in 1792. Today, most exchanges are for-profit companies and 
these companies make more money for their shareholders when traders, for instance, high 
frequency traders, use their venues to trade. Profit-driven exchanges’ priorities are no 
longer the everyday long-term investor, but instead their priorities lie with the traders 
generating the most income for their shareholders.  Hence, these exchanges cater to the 
high frequency traders. It is not possible, nor plausible, for human investors to trade the 
same volume as a high frequency trading firm and it is not feasible for most investors to 
pay for preferential access via co-location, which means that the for-profit exchanges 
would lose money if they catered to long-term investors  
B.  ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
Algorithmic trading started in the 90’s (Bréhier, 2013) and has, like many other 
technologies grown and expanded at a rapid speed. Algorithmic trading has grown to 
become half of the US equity market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014). There are many 
different forms of algorithmic trading, some use algorithms to detect news updates and 
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others use algorithms to detect price discrepancies. Algorithms can scan news releases 
and use artificial intelligence to interpret the news and employ algorithms to determine 
the best trading strategy based on the information from the news. Algorithmic trading can 
be used to correct price discrepancies between two exchanges. When prices on different 
exchanges do not match up, algorithms can choose to buy or sell stock to take advantage 
of the price discrepancy. Algorithmic trading is only going to increase as we move 
forward in the 21st century. Another type of algorithmic trading is high frequency trading. 
High frequency trading uses mathematical algorithms to determine what trade to make 
and to execute that trade at an extremely rapid speed to earn very small profits per trade.  
According to Harris (2013) several reliable studies have shown that transaction 
cost has decreased since algorithmic trading became part of the financial markets. The 
decrease in transaction cost is due to the fact that computers have advantages over human 
traders in that they have seamless attention spans, follow instructions precisely as told, do 
not let any emotions cloud or act on their judgment, can learn and watch thousands of 
different sources for information at the same time, do not cheat, cost less than their 
human counterpart, and they do not require as much office space. (Harris) 
 Harris (2013) describes the different categories of algorithmic trading: The first 
category is called dealing and arbitrage and according to the article it is the most common 
form of algorithmic trading. Dealing and arbitrage adds value to the market through 
offering liquidity, or moving liquidity to and from different markets. Another category 
that Harris discussed monitors newsfeeds for information regarding particular firms. 
These algorithms monitor newsfeeds and interpret and trade on the news based on the 
data collected. To lose to someone who is better informed, is nothing new, however many 
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people dislike the idea that they lose only because they cannot act as quickly as 
algorithmic traders can about fundamental news events. (Harris)  
C. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING HISTORY 
 Humans have and hopefully always will try to come up with new innovations to 
improve their existence. When the Internet began in the 1980’s the world began to 
change, and the stock market followed this trend. The desire to build faster, more 
powerful computers, and to use more complex and extensive programming started when 
investment companies and the exchanges realized how much money there was to be 
made in the high frequency trading business. (Patterson, 2012)  
High frequency trading started earlier than what most would assume, in the 1990’s 
(Patterson, 2012). Early high frequency trading was simple computer trading operations 
linking to an exchange. Due to regulations, such as Regulation alternative trading systems 
(Reg ATS) and Regulation national market system (Reg NMS), and advances in 
technology, high frequency traders were able to grow and become the powerful and fast 
machines that they are today. 
Before the aforementioned regulations came into place, a company by the name of 
Instinet was using an alternative trading system to trade. Instinet users would frequently 
place I-Only orders to trade (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). I-Only orders were popular as 
these orders were seen by only institutional investors.  I-only orders were large in size but 
as they were only seen by other institutions wanting to transact in large quantities, I-only 
orders did not move the price when executed.  Instinet offered I-only since the firm did 
not believe that one market was made for all different types of trading (Arnuk & Saluzzi). 
When Reg ATS was implemented, Instinet became a dominant ECN (Arnuk & Saluzzi). 
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ECNs are Electronic Communication Networks and they have the benefit of 
anonymously matching buyer and seller, without the need of human intervention (Bodie, 
Kane & Marcus, 2014). Although matching could be done anonymously, the passage of 
Reg ATS required Instinet to display its private quotes—its I-only orders. According to 
Arnuk & Saluzzi, Reg ATS was created, more or less, to stop I-only orders. The stopping 
of I-only orders through Reg ATS was the first real start to high frequency trader’s major 
take-over of the U.S. markets (Arnuk & Saluzzi). Reg ATS added more transparency in 
an attempt to make the market fairer as more traders could see more quotes. But, some of 
the traders benefiting from that transparency included high frequency traders. A 
revolution of algorithmic trading had begun, thanks to the regulations implemented by 
the SEC, high frequency traders had not only survived because of their strategies using 
advanced algorithms, but also because various exchanges and SEC regulations helped 
them. According to Patterson (2012), this help included the SEC putting the interests of 
high frequency traders above all other participants in the market through regulation, and 
caused the creation of the mechanism that high frequency traders needed to succeed.   
 Just a little over a decade ago, most stocks were traded by a broker on the NYSE 
or NASDAQ. In ten years the markets have rapidly changed. Just over ten years ago, the 
SEC required all US stock markets to switch to the decimal system.  Spreads became 
smaller very quickly as did the trade sizes and quoted depth. Because of the regulation, 
high frequency trading started growing even more, and by 2009 high frequency traders 
had 70% of the market (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). With the growth of high frequency 
trading came more structure risk. A smaller spread and smaller trade sizes fueled the 
growth of high frequency trading firms. A high frequency trader is a short term trader in 
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its truest form, high frequency traders transact large quantities of small trades, instead of 
having fewer, but larger trades.  
 Reg NMS was implemented in 2007 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) 
and mandated the current rules for disseminating the national best bid and offer (NBBO). 
The NBBO is the national best bid and offer from all trading venues. With Reg NMS, an 
order is automatically routed to the exchange with the best price, even if that means that 
the entire order will not be filled on that one exchange.  
Technological advances have made the markets operate faster and more efficiently. 
The main problem is not how to get rid of high frequency trading, but how to embrace 
technology and at the same time have it under control. 
D. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING METHODS 
 High frequency trading works in different ways depending on the type of high 
frequency trading and the goals of high frequency traders. The basic concept of high 
frequency trading is to use a network of computers co-located at the various exchanges to 
trade. Because the system uses algorithms to trade, it can execute the trades faster than a 
human can blink.  It can do so as computers are not affected by emotions and feelings, 
and computers have advanced processing software already built in. Humans must process 
the information and make a decision to trade, which takes far longer. Computers 
compared to human traders are also able to simultaneously gather information from a 
large scope of information sources. The computers can then process that information 
faster than regular investors, all the while making trading decisions, which causes the 
high frequency traders to enter and cancel orders based on the new information received. 
A regular trader would have great difficulty keeping track of so much information at 
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once. That computers have the above stated advantages can be both negative and 
positive. The positive includes that the way we trade becomes more efficient as the use of 
computers and technology increases, the cost gets lower as technology is expanded, and 
we no longer need as much human capital since computers can now take over many of 
the jobs of humans. On the other hand, the financial markets are not regulated well 
enough for computers to function without human intervention. An unfair market is not to 
any institutional or human investor’s advantage, and the institutional investors are the 
ones investing capital into the market. 
 Unlike human traders who buy and sell securities based on fundamental or 
technical information, high frequency trading firms buy and sell based on speed and 
information gained through co-located servers. High frequency traders purchase 
preferential access to the exchanges, and hence the order and trade information of the 
exchange, via co-location, which implicitly hurts the retail investor who does not have 
this advantage.  High frequency traders make money by beating other traders to the trade. 
High frequency traders are not like regular investors as they do not care about the 
security they trade since they will not hold on to it for long (Gregoriou, 2015). If a stock 
broker enters an order to sell 1000 shares of XYZ company, the high frequency trading 
firm’s co-located computer detects that the order has been entered and will execute. The 
high frequency trading firm, using its speed and co-located servers, beats the stock broker 
to another exchange, buys the XYZ stock, and then sells it to the broker for a higher 
price. The regular investor would lose “only” a few cents per trade, which to most 
investors is not a huge loss. That is why it took so long for the market to discover what 
high frequency traders were doing. High frequency trading firms were making a lot of 
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money on earning a few cents from a large number of investors. The average return that a 
high frequency trader makes on one transaction is $5.05 (Goldstein, Kumar & Graves, 
2014). A high frequency trading firm that ‘front runs’ had gross trading profits of 
$45,267 per day in 2010, compared to gross profits of $2,461 per day for a firm that does 
not front run (Goldstein, Kumar & Graves) If one investor lost the same amount that high 
frequency traders made, the practice would have been noticed sooner. 
When discussing what high frequency traders are doing to hurt the market, the 
term front running is widely used (Harris, 2013). Front running is discussed in the book 
Flash Boys by Michal Lewis (2014). High frequency traders are front running non-high 
frequency traders and thus make non-high frequency traders’ trades more 
expensive.  There are two types of front runners according to Harris: 
 1) Order anticipation is when high frequency traders anticipate what order the 
trader will submit. High frequency traders are able to anticipate an order by using 
algorithms to examine previous orders and trades to predict when a trader will split up a 
large order. High frequency trading firms will then trade ahead of the trader with their 
faster co-located computers and profit from the price change they initiate.  
2) Quote matching refers to standing orders that have already been posted. High 
frequency trading firms simply trade ahead of orders and increase the price slightly or 
trade in another venue. When prices change in favor of high frequency traders, they 
profit, and when it does not, high frequency traders immediately exit their orders by 
trading with standing limit orders. “They profit by extracting option values from standing 
limit orders submitted by slower traders” (Harris, 2013, p.7). Quote matching causes 
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problems since the trader who originally issued the standing order is forced to trade when 
they do not want to and fail to trade when they wish to. (Harris)  
Other tactics that the high frequency traders use are quote stuffing, spoofing and 
momentum ignition (Gregoriou, 2015). Quote stuffing is when the high frequency firms 
enter and immediately cancel a multitude of orders for a security. High frequency trading 
firms enter a multitude of orders to slow down competition. When quotes are entered, 
whether reasonably near the best bid or offer or far away from the best prices, other 
traders have to analyze these quotes, which creates an advantage for the high frequency 
trading firm that placed the orders. Spoofing is when one trader is teasing information 
from other traders by placing and canceling orders (Pandey & Wu, 2015) Placing “fake” 
orders to move the price in a particular direction is illegal (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission), but it can be hard to prove. Momentum ignition is when a high frequency 
firm enters orders, sometimes in combination with spreading false rumors, to make other 
traders start trading more rapidly to make the price move up or down faster. All of these 
different strategies are on the verge of being illegal, but hard to prove as they are done at 
such rapid speed.  
E. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING ORIGINS 
We live in a technology driven society where companies and people strive to be 
as effective and efficient as possible. It is human nature to develop innovations to make 
life easier, cheaper, more efficient, etc. Trading in the security markets is no different. 
Using computers to trade instead of humans was more a question about when than why 
and how. In the book, Dark pools, Scott Patterson (2012) discusses how the value of 
computer programmers has increased in the stock market. Using algorithms to trade is not 
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a problem in itself, even algorithmic trading with very rapid speed is not a problem. The 
problem, or the reason high frequency trading is the widely debated topic that it is today, 
is due to profit driven traders coupled with regulation that enables these traders to take 
advantage of others. 
When high frequency trading, as we know it today, started it was kept in the dark, 
it was secret. And no wonder, since the people who started it were sitting on a gold mine. 
The book flash boys (Lewis, 2014) discusses how a company, Spread Networks, wanted 
to lay a fiber optic cable line between Chicago and New York. The cable was 825 miles 
long and the price tag was $300-million (Gregoriou, 2015). According to Lewis, no one 
understood why a company wanted to spend all that money on a cable that would run 
straight from New York to Chicago; and when an outsider asked, he was told it was a 
secret project (Lewis). The reason why the line was so important was because high 
frequency trading firms compete on speed, and by having a straight optical cable between 
the exchanges, a firm buying space on that cable could win the game—make the distance 
faster, which would generate higher profits. If other firms knew about the high speed 
cable, they would want in and would compete at the same speed. High frequency trading 
only works for the company that is the fastest. High frequency trading companies 
compete using co-location to gain speed as well. Co-location is the term for having a 
firm’s computer located in the same facility as the exchange’s matching engine. Being 
co-located means that a company can have access to the exchange’s data—trade and 
quote information—faster as the firm will not have to wait for the information to travel 
through the public feed.  To a regular person, co-location seems ridiculous, but to a high 
frequency trader, it is everything, it can be all about who is a millisecond faster. 
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F. DARK POOLS 
Dark pools originated for investors that wanted anonymity when trading large 
orders. When the financial markets started to change due to all the rules and regulations 
implemented by the SEC, especially with Reg NMS, it became hard for investors to trade 
larger blocks of stocks without moving the price in the market due to high frequency 
trading front running them (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012) In response to the new regulations 
the exchanges and some investment banks created dark pools, where the bid and ask 
prices were hidden and the pool, theoretically, offered full anonymity. Since the orders 
submitted to the dark pools were hidden, and only invited investors could trade in the 
pool, high frequency traders could not view these orders. Dark pools also benefited large 
traders since orders submitted and executed did not dramatically affect the price of the 
stock. If an investor is selling a large order of stocks he/she does not want to move the 
price too much since that means less money for the investor who is trying to sell the 
stock.  
Stock Exchanges, brokers, and owners of automated trading systems, according to 
Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012), have helped high frequency traders receive access to dark 
pools. One example of high frequency traders having access to dark pools happened in 
2011 with Pipeline. According to Arnuk and Saluzzi, Pipeline had secretly traded against 
their own investors. In Flash Boys, Lewis (2014) discussed that several investment banks 
and financial institutions allowed high frequency traders to enter their dark pools. Lewis 
provides more proof of how large financial institutions were using dark pools as a means 
to earn more money. Since high frequency traders submit such large amounts of orders, 
the financial institutions that allow high frequency traders to use their dark pools to trade, 
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earn more money by charging fees to grant access to high frequency trading firms. 
Allowing high frequency traders access to the dark pool creates a conflict of interest 
between the organization who owns the dark pool and the institutional investor who uses 
it. The conflict of interest is particularly troubling when an institutional investor with a 
large position in a stock chose to trade in a dark pool to protect their position and the 
corresponding orders from high frequency traders, and pays the company that owns the 
dark pool for access to trade in it. At the same time, the owners of the same dark pool are 
also charging high frequency traders to be allowed to trade in the dark pool with the 
institutional investor. A dark pool earns money when trades are executed in the pool 
(Patterson, 2012). Dark pools allow high frequency trading firms access as they are 
supplying such large quantities of orders, and the larger the number of orders submitted 
to a particular pool, the higher the probability that orders will execute in that pool. 
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CHAPTER III: THE IMPACT OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING ON THE STOCK 
MARKET 
In the not too distant past, market makers were either specialists (on the NYSE) or 
dealers (on NASDAQ) who were acting as liquidity providers to the financial markets 
and benefiting from the market maker’s spread. Now, according to the Guilbaud and 
Pham (2013), any market participant can act as a market maker because of the rise of 
electronic trading. The ease of acting as a liquidity provider has created competition in 
liquidity provision in the financial markets. This competition has reduced effective 
market spreads and reduced indirect cost (Guilbaud & Pham). High frequency traders act 
as market makers as they constantly submit and cancel orders.  High frequency traders 
may detect when an order is placed and partially executed at one exchange, but not 
fulfilled at that exchange. With high speed, the high frequency trader, can reach another 
exchange with the next NBBO price, purchase the stock, raise price slightly, sell it back 
to the original investor who entered the order, and pocket the different prices, or spread, 
between the two prices. Even though the aforementioned order would likely have been 
filled as it worked through the posted liquidity on the various exchanges, the high 
frequency trader is considered to be acting like a market maker in the sense that it 
provided liquidity to the unfulfilled portion of the order.  However, high frequency 
traders are not under the same obligations as a traditional market maker regarding when 
or how much liquidity must be provided.  Proponents of high frequency trading see it as a 
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way to increase liquidity and efficiency in the financial markets. Those who are 
opposed see high frequency trading as an extra cost on a market that is already efficient, 
adding another middle man. (Patterson, 2012) 
 High frequency trading firms turned to leverage to maximize profits. According to 
Patterson (2012) in the late 2000’s, high frequency firms were leveraged with a ratio 
from 50 to 1. High frequency traders were able to become so highly leveraged as they 
were turning profits almost every day (Patterson), which cause banks and other investors 
to trust high frequency trading firms with their money.  
 Another reasonably recent innovation in financial markets is the 
maker/taker system (Gregoriou, 2015). This system is used by many exchanges and 
trading venues.  Although the maker/taker rebates/fees vary from exchange to exchange, 
the most frequently used system pays (rebates) a trader who provides liquidity and 
charges a fee to the trader who takes liquidity (Gregoriou).  Since the fee charged for 
taking liquidity is necessarily larger that the rebate provided to the liquidity provider, the 
exchange where the trade takes place pockets the difference.  The more liquidity 
supplying orders that are entered at a particular venue, the higher the probability that one 
of those orders execute and provide liquidity to a liquidity demanding order.  The 
exchanges earn more money the more trades that execute at their exchanges–they pocket 
more differences between the make and take amounts.  Hence, high frequency traders 
receive special privileges as they submit a large quantity of orders to the exchanges 
(Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Some exchanges increase the maker rebate for traders who 
transaction a higher quantity of trades at their venue (Patterson, 2012). Another privilege 
that high frequency traders pay for, which is also a problem to the regular investor, is 
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preferential access via co-location. Exchanges have an incentive to sell preferential 
access to the exchange’s trade and quote information since exchanges earn money from 
co-location fees. High frequency traders are willing to pay for co-location since the closer 
a firm’s co-located computer is to the exchange’s main computer terminal, the faster the 
co-located firm gets the information and the shorter the distance the co-located firm’s 
algorithmic orders need to travel, which gives the co-located high frequency trading firm 
an advantage in the speed game.  To illustrate the outcome of winning at the speed game, 
one high frequency trading firm reported that it had gone four years without a loss for the 
day (Lewis, 2014).  
 At the same time that high frequency trading firms are earning more 
money by being faster to the trade, the exchanges are also earning more money. The 
exchanges that are not selling co-location are not.  High frequency firms submit orders 
where they have the best advantage, which include faster execution and better 
information via co-location.  Exchanges not selling co-location will not receive the large 
quantity of orders from high frequency traders, hence will likely not be executing the 
same quantity of trades.  Not allowing co-location are causing the investors at exchanges 
that do not allow co-location to have higher trading costs since their orders cannot be 
executed at the best price (Pandey & Wu, 2015). The conflict of interest, selling co-
location to high frequency traders, continues as for-profit exchanges must cater to the 
traders who supply them with the most profits (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012).  
High frequency trading firms also gain an advantage through purchasing 
information about firms’ financial reports before other institutional investors. High 
frequency trading firms may purchase the financial report directly from the same provider 
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that will send out this information to other business sources, who then will release them 
to the public investor (Gregoriou, 2015). Gregoriou discusses an example where a high 
frequency trading firm purchased access to the financial report of a company named 
ULTA. On December 5th 2013 ULTA’s stock price dropped rapidly because high 
frequency traders received information about ULTA’s earnings milliseconds before it 
reached the public, and started trading on the information. High frequency traders sold 
$800,000 worth of stock in those milliseconds. The institutional investors who received 
the news milliseconds later were already starting out trading at a loss as the price of the 
stock had already dropped by the time they were able to react to the information from the 
financial report.  
A.  LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS 
Another debated topic is whether or not high frequency traders supply liquidity to 
the market. High frequency traders may supply liquidity in the sense that they are 
entering and executing large quantities of orders. According to Gregoriou (2015) liquidity 
is the fine balance and combination of systemic liquidity in market stress and search 
liquidity in a normal market. Liquidity in market stress is liquidity that is provided when 
the market is going down and search liquidity is liquidity that is provided in a stable and 
efficient market. High frequency trading does not meet both of these liquidity 
requirement since high frequency traders are not required to provide liquidity in market 
stress (Gregoriou). 
By increasing the speed at which orders can be placed and canceled, an illusion of 
liquidity is created (Patterson, 2012). Liquidity, the ease with which one can convert an 
asset to cash, without suffering a loss, is important to investors.  When a stock is liquid, 
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investors can enter the market (buy stock) and feel confident that they can sell the stock 
without losing a lot of money. Liquid markets make investors comfortable to take more 
risk (Patterson). Bréhier (2013) states, “Some studies conclude that it [high frequency 
traders] provides liquidity to markets”, when, in reality, high frequency traders provide 
false liquidity (Lewis, 2014; and Patterson, 2012). High frequency traders buy and sell 
large quantity of shares every day as long as the markets are in their favor. In downturns, 
high frequency traders do not provide liquidity, they instead take and demand the little 
liquidity that is left in the market. (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Going from increments of 
$1/8 and $1/16 to a 100 decimal point system in the stock market caused limit orders to 
be less clustered, and price quotes to become thinner and spread out (Arnuk & Saluzzi,).  
A lack of liquidity may be a problem when the public loses trust in the market. 
More than $250 billion dollars have been withdrawn from domestic equity mutual funds 
in the United States since 2010 (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Because of withdrawn money 
in domestic equity mutual funds, the economy as a whole can suffer since companies 
depend on the financial markets as a way of raising capital (Arnuk & Saluzzi). According 
to Arnuk and Saluzzi, liquidity in the market was more stable and easier to predict when 
long term investors were the source of liquidity. The liquidity provided was “real”, unlike 
the liquidity provided by high frequency traders, which is not. According to Bréhier 
(2013) there are two different types of liquidity to be considered. There is “natural 
liquidity”, which is what the economic players provide to the market, and there is 
“liquidity of opportunity”, which is what is provided when a trader takes a tactical 
position. Liquidity of opportunity currently accounts for 80% of the market, and it is the 
category of liquidity provided by high frequency traders. 
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B.  COST 
The few cents that an institutional investor loses when large orders are executed at 
different prices as the order moves from exchange to exchange getting partial executions 
along the way do not, generally, add up to a large sum of money.  However, when 
considering the large number of trades that are being partially executed at multiple 
exchanges by high frequency trading firms, the profits that high frequency trading firms 
are making becomes large. Patterson (2012) describes the situation in the book, Dark 
Pools, as follows:  when you lose money in a mutual fund due to high frequency traders 
front-running you, even if it is not a considerable amount, it is money that you can no 
longer reinvest in the market. That reinvestment value will add up if calculated over a 
long period of time and it turns out to be a large sum of money that an institutional 
investor could have saved, but failed to do so due to high frequency trading.  
C. FLASH CRASH 
The flash crash occurred on May 6th 2010. According to SEC’s website, the 
equity market had a severe disturbance that occurred in the matter of minutes. A large 
number of securities started to decline rapidly and then started to increase again once the 
problem was located. The fast shift and high volatility in prices did not go unnoticed by 
the market. A lot of trades were executed at a severely low prices. According to the SEC, 
“including many that were more than 60% away from pre-decline prices and were broken 
by the exchanges and FINRA” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]).  The 
Dow Jones average fell by 1,000 points for the day, and it fell by 583 points within seven 
minutes (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). 
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High frequency trading was part of the flash crash according to Arnuk and Saluzzi 
(2012). When the flash crash started and the Dow Jones started to drop rapidly; a human 
trader could detect that something was fundamentally wrong, but a computer working via 
algorithms could not. Goldstein, Kumar and Graves (2014) state that high frequency 
traders kept pushing down the prices by aggressively selling what stock they currently 
owned, which meant that trading volume increased for high frequency traders. When the 
volume increased, volatility increased, which prompted long term investors to withdraw 
from the market and left high frequency traders to compete with themselves. Eventually, 
high frequency traders backed out too and liquidity in the market plummeted further. The 
reason why liquidity disappeared is because the “liquidity” provided by high frequency 
traders is provided only when the markets are normal (Gregoriou, 2015). When the 
markets start to shift, and volatility increases, high frequency traders “take” the liquidity. 
When the source of the flash crash was discovered, the market started to bounce back. 
According to Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2014), the SEC approved circuit breakers 
to prevent this type of algorithmic malfunction in the future. If a stock increases or 
decreases more than 10% within a 5-minute period, the circuit breaker will halt trading. 
The circuit breaker rule was implemented in a series of stages (Bodie, Kane & Marcus). 
In March 2016, a man named Navinder Sarao was charged by the court in 
England to be extradited to the United States since he allegedly played a role in the flash 
crash. According to Forbes, Sarao used spoofing to earn an advantage and money in the 
U.S. market (Gara, 2016).  Spoofing is illegal and as stated above in this thesis, spoofing 
is when one trader is teasing information from other traders by placing and canceling fake 
orders. Although the flash crash happened five years ago, who or what caused the flash 
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crash is still uncertain. Most sources agree that algorithmic trading had some part in it 
(Goldstein, Kumar & Graves, 2014), and that it brought attention to the fragile U.S. 
market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014). 
D.  HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING BENEFITS 
  Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt & Ysusi (2014) relay that most 
academic research points towards high frequency trading having improved measures of 
financial market quality such as volatility and liquidity. Menkveld (2013) claims that 
high frequency trading firms decrease the spread by 50%. Carrion (2013) claims that 
when spreads are wide high frequency trading firms provide liquidity. However, 
Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi claims that liquidity might only help a few 
investors, but not institutional investor. Gregoriou (2015) states that regardless if high 
frequency traders have provided real liquidity or not, they have helped narrow the spread, 
which is beneficial to all investors since the fees paid by investors are not as high. 
However, Gregoriou fails to mention what happens to the traditional market makers when 
unregulated high frequency traders take their place. Bréhier (2013) states that because 
high frequency traders have taken over the roles of traditional market makers, they have 
encouraged market transparency, as well as helped the overall economy by providing 
additional liquidity, since it will become easier for a company to obtain capital for 
investments. As described earlier in the thesis, high frequency traders supply a false sort 
of liquidity that is beneficial only when markets are running smoothly. Just because 
studies show that market liquidity has improved in the last few years, it does not mean 
that high frequency traders are responsible for the improvement. Regulations, such as 
Reg NMS, may have helped with improving market liquidity (Bréhier)
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CHAPTER IV: CURRENT REGULATIONS REGARDING  HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING 
“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. The SEC strives to promote a market 
environment that is worthy of the public's trust”( U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission[SEC]). The SEC must be careful not to harm the markets when considering 
new legislative action. Tough regulations may stifle market advances and innovations, 
which are two drivers for competition (Bréhier, 2013).  
A.  U.S. MARKET 
Regulation has helped pave the way for high frequency trading in both U.S. and 
European markets (Gregoriou, 2015). In 1998, the SEC approved Regulation Alternative 
Trading Systems (Reg ATS)( U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Reg ATS was 
implemented to regulate a new method used to trade: Electronic communication networks 
(ECNs). The SEC wanted to add more transparency to the markets. Through Reg ATS, 
most ECNs were forced to show all of their orders to the public. According to Arnuk and 
Saluzzi (2012), Reg ATS “required alternative trading systems that trade 5 percent or 
more of the volume in national market system securities to be linked with a registered 
market in order to disseminate the best priced orders in those national market system 
securities displayed in their systems (including institutional orders) into the public quote 
stream”(p. 69). The SEC succeeded in adding more transparency, but the added 
transparency helped high frequency trading firms succeed.  
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Nanex showed that the national best bid and offer spread did not narrow after the 
government imposed Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in 2007 (Pandey & 
Wu, 2015). Reg NMS was to help promote fair price competition. Instead of helping the 
market, Reg NMS had unintended consequences according to Lewis (2014). All that Reg 
NMS has done is give the illusion of liquidity to the market (Pandey & Wu).  
In August 2000, all stocks started trading on a 100-point decimal system (Arnuk 
& Saluzzi, 2012). According to Arnuk and Saluzzi, one flaw in Reg NMS is the lack of a 
minimum spread or price increment. When pricing changed from$1/8 and $1/16 to 
decimals, it became easier for high frequency traders to step in front of other’s orders, 
since it required only a penny to do so. 
Reg NMS also stipulated that an order to buy or sell a stock had to be routed to 
the venue with the best posted price. So, a stock that normally would have traded on the 
NYSE now had to go to the exchange with the best price, even if that meant that the order 
had to be executed at several different exchanges. Depth at the best price decreased with 
decimalization. So, a large order would, most likely, partially execute on multiple 
exchanges since, by law, the order had to be routed to the venue with the best price even 
if the depth at the best price was not sufficient to cover the order.  Inadvertently, Reg 
NMS made speed extremely important.  The trader who could get an order to the 
exchange with the lowest price first would be able to obtain that price. Since high 
frequency traders were the fastest traders in the markets, they were able to detect the 
large order, trade ahead of the partially-filled order, instantaneously submit an order at a 
slightly improved price (in other words, become the next best price) to then trade with the 
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partially-filled large order at a profit.  Reg NMS enhanced high frequency trading firms’ 
front running techniques. 
Further, Reg NMS also drove many market makers, who dealt with small and 
mid-cap stocks, out of business due to margin compressions (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). 
Arnuk and Saluzzi state that previous market makers were required to provide liquidity in 
the market (when there was no liquidity) and to withdraw liquidity (when liquidity was 
too high) to help regulate the market and decrease inventory risk. High frequency traders, 
with high volume of order submissions, took the place of traditional market makers, but 
without the associated rules and regulations. When liquidity was plentiful, high frequency 
traders traded more, which further increased liquidity. When liquidity was low, high 
frequency traders withdrew from the markets, thus decreasing liquidity even more.  
Average trade size decreased with high frequency traders (in conjunction with 
Reg NMS) as large orders had to be routed from exchange to exchange partially filling at 
each best price. Partial execution at the best price allowed high frequency trader to front 
run partially-filled orders and grab a chunk of the profits. Traditional market makers are 
not allowed to front run orders since they have a negative obligation (Gregoriou, 2015). 
Having a negative obligation means that market makers are not allowed to interfere with 
the market for their own personal gain if the markets are efficient enough that buyers and 
sellers match up (Investopedia, 2003). 
The reason as to why the SEC implemented regulations, such as Reg ATS and 
Reg NMS, have been questioned by many. One thing is certain and that is if not for these 
regulations high frequency trading would not have been what it is today (Arnuk & 
Saluzzi, 2012). The U.S stock market was long known as the greatest in the world, and a 
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big part of the American dream. “Reg ATS killed the goose that laid the golden egg of a 
U.S stock market that the rest of the world envied for its capacity to embrace risk and 
drive entrepreneurship and innovation in ways that gave birth to entire new industries and 
drove U.S economic leadership.” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, p. 202) 
B.  LULD PLAN 
One common measure of market risk is volatility. During the Flash Crash, 
volatility increased significantly. The Limit Up/Limit Down (LULD) Plan was created to 
prevent high volatility in the stock market (FINRA, 2012). The LULD Plan was filed by 
FINRA in 2012 to try to ensure that the markets were kept fair and orderly. According to 
FINRA’s website, the LULD Plan should prevent the kind of volatile price movements 
that happened during the flash crash in May 2010.  
C.  EUROPE/SWEDEN 
 High frequency trading in the London Stock Exchange is not much different than 
in American exchanges. Current European regulations (as of July 2010) do not require all 
high frequency traders to file transaction reports, and do not require high frequency 
traders to be registered under the markets in financial instruments directive (MiFID) 
(Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt & Ysusi, 2014). The rapid changes in financial markets 
and time required to pass and implement regulations exist in European markets as well as 
U.S. ones. MiFID 1 was implemented in 2007 (Bréhier, 2013), but in 2012 it was already 
starting to be revised. MiFID 1 was European markets’ Reg ATS. The directive opened 
up competition with technology in the markets (Gregoriou, 2015).  
MiFID II, which applies to all member states within the European Union, was 
passed in 2014. Regulations from MiFID II deal with the rise of high frequency trading as 
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well as algorithmic trading (THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL, 2014). European legislators are making a clear distinction between 
algorithmic trading and high frequency trading to better help the market when regulating 
it. MiFID II states that any person who is dealing with high frequency trading falls under 
the rules and regulations set forth by MiFID II (Gregoriou, 2015). MiFID II states that all 
high frequency trading firms have to register, have to keep records about all orders 
placed, cancelled and executed, and that all records need to be available for the 
authorities upon request to make sure that the proper regulations are followed 
(Gregoriou). MiFID II also states that any investment firm participating in algorithmic 
trading and taking a market making strategy has to enter into a written agreement to carry 
out the market making position and provide liquidity. Lastly, MiFID II states that the 
regulated European markets have to perform tests of existing algorithms in their markets 
and limit the ratio of unexecuted orders. Because of these regulations, it will be easier to 
detect system capacity being strained, and MiFID II will help the regulated European 
markets slow the order flow if system capacity is strained (Gregoriou). The regulated 
European markets also have to ensure that are no incentives to encourage disorderly 
trading or market abuse. MiFID II requires fees on canceled orders based on how long 
they were in force.  A fee on canceled orders will impede high frequency traders who 
submit large quantities of orders that are in force for less than one second. According to 
Gregoriou, the regulated European markets may also have to impose even higher fees on 
high frequency traders that constantly cancel and hold orders for a short period of time, 
which would further hurt those traders that put a strain on the financial system. 
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 The same problem that is happening in the American markets, regarding investors 
losing their trust in the markets, is happening in the Swedish market as well. When high 
frequency traders are able to trade at a rapid speed and in such large quantities, investors 
have no method to keep up with that competition, neither do investors have enough 
money to buy fast trading computers (Finansliv, 2015). Finansliv.se interviewed Per H 
Börjesson who is CEO for Investment AB Spiltan, Börjesson believes that if this trend 
with high frequency traders taking over the market and having preferential treatments 
within the exchanges continue to happening, the investors will leave the markets. This is 
a trend discussed earlier in this paper that is happening in the United States as well. When 
investors lose their faith in the market, with no hope to regain it, they stop investing. 
 Sveriges Radio interviewed Björn Hagström, an Associate Professor of Finance at 
Stockholm University, in a radio show called “Robotar tar över ekonomin”. In the 
interview Hagström claims that the different types of high frequency traders matter and 
that different algorithms exist for the different types of trading. As has been stressed prior 
in this thesis, high frequency traders are not long-term investors, who are buying the 
stock because they analyzed the company and want to take part in the future of the 
company—both the profits and risk associated with stock ownership. According to 
Hagström, high frequency traders do not care what they buy, they buy these stocks on the 
Swedish exchange only to earn easy money. 
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CHAPTER V: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: THOSE TO BLAME 
 How did high frequency trading grow to be such a dominant player in 
financial markets? To quote former senator Ted Kauffman, “It is simply a truism that 
whenever there is a lot of money surging into a risky area, where change in the market is 
dramatic, where there is no transparency and therefore no effective regulation, we have a 
prescription for disaster” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012, p. Xii). 
If what Kauffman states is true, is there an entity to fault for the problems 
associated with high frequency traders in the financial markets? Is it the high frequency 
trading firms who have taken advantage of the opportunity created for them, or the 
entities who created the opportunity? The answer is both. Most of the discussion 
regarding high frequency trading has focused on the negatives of high frequency trading, 
include most of my sources for this thesis. The U.S. government through is regulation did 
not do enough to prevent the issues with high frequency trading firms.  Rather, the 
government instituted regulations to help it. If the SEC is constantly lagging the new 
technology, new regulations will not be effective. Further, it does not work for 
regulations to take over five years to be passed and implemented in a rapidly changing 
technology market. If the regulators are addressing a problem that came about five years 
ago, the technologically advanced companies are already five years ahead in their new 
trading techniques. The argument made by Bréhier (2013) is as follows: ”Professor Jean 
Hilaire concludes that the entire history of stock exchanges is dominated by prohibitions 
which are continuously being circumvented” (Bréhier, p. 71). We need faster and more 
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efficient solutions to the problem at hand so that the regulations are not 
circumvented by the time they become effective. 
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CHAPTER VI:  IEX STOCK EXCHANGE 
 The Investors’ Exchange, IEX, was founded because of the unfair advantages on 
other trading venues. According to the book Flash boys by Michael Lewis (2014), IEX 
was started by Brad Katsuyama because he believed that the U.S. stock market was 
rigged. Most trading venues allow high frequency traders to purchase preferential access 
to the venue via co-location.  High frequency traders profit through co-location and the 
trading venues share in the profits as well by executing a larger share of market trades. 
According to Brad Katsuyama, preferential access created unfair practices, which led to 
the stock market being rigged.  He quit his job as Global Head of Electronic Sales and 
Trading at RBC Capital Markets and started a new trading venue together with other 
experienced people in the financial industry. In August of 2015, IEX applied for 
exchange status (Investors Exchange [IEX]). 
 IEX differs from the other trading venues as IEX has created a speed bump to 
make the trading equal and fair to all investors. The speed bump creates a delay of three 
hundred and fifty millionths of a second (Tepper, 2016). According to IEX, the speed 
bump will not affect long-term investors, but it will have a large impact on traders that 
compete on speed, like high frequency traders. 
A Business Insider article written by Turner (2015) relays that IEX is not the only 
exchange with this technique (altering the speed of traders’ market access), but they are 
the only ones who use it fairly. The other trading venues alter speed only for those who 
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pay for the advantage. According to Pandey and Wu (2015), “IEX is able to route 
orders to multiple exchanges simultaneously in order to avoid front-running in a 
fragmented market” (p. 56). Since part of the larger problem with high frequency trader 
lies with front-running, IEX can help overcome that problem with the help of their speed 
bump.  
IEX affects the market both positively and negatively, depending on the source. 
According to the SEC filing application website, many large investors and investment 
banks supports the idea of IEX being approved as an exchange. One of the people that is 
in favor of IEX becoming an exchange is Paul M. Russo, managing Director of the 
Securities Division for Goldman and Sachs. According to Russo, IEX will help to 
enhance the quality of U.S. equity markets. Russo believes that IEX will offer an 
exchange where traders who do not value the fastest speed and investors who want to 
trade larger blocks of stock will gain. Also according to the SEC filing application 
website, Charles M. Jones, Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia Business 
School, wrote a response letter to the SEC not supporting IEX’s application for exchange 
status. Jones claims, “The Commission should think twice before approving a national 
securities exchange application with these anti-competitive features”. Jones states that the 
IEX speed bump is applied in a discriminatory way since the undisplayed orders at the 
IEX exchange will have an advantage over displayed orders at other exchanges. The IEX 
speed bump would be applied only 15% of the time. Jones analyzed data flow and found 
that, through the speed bump, investors with the disadvantage would be impacted by 1.67 
cents per share. 
 
39 
 
CHAPTER VII:  POTENTIAL REGULATIONS 
The debate about the harm or aid to market quality brought about by high 
frequency trading continues. It is hard to determine a solution or even if a solution is 
needed. Harris (2013) suggests that the government enact a regulation requiring 
companies to announce to the exchanges when they expect important information to be 
revealed during trading hours. Harris also suggested that information should only be 
released when the market is closed or at a pre-announced time. Announcing information 
only at certain times, liquidity suppliers would have time to assess the impact of the 
information and thus not hurt the liquidity of the market. The law suggested by Harris is 
an action that many governments have already put in place. Harris’s third and perhaps 
most helpful suggestion is that the best way to prevent high frequency traders from taking 
over the market would be to use a randomizer. If the regulators would delay each order 
between 0 to 10 milliseconds, high frequency traders would only “win” 59.5% of the 
time.  A randomizer would diminish the problem of front running. It would also lower the 
cost of entry and reduce technology expenditures, which would not hurt or affect the 
quality of the market. The benefits would also ensure that high frequency trading is a 
competitive business where high frequency traders compete only with each other, and not 
institutional investors. By having high frequency trading companies compete with each 
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other and not ordinary investors, high frequency traders would continue to 
improve prices and quoted depth and would also provide the market with low transaction 
costs (Harris). 
The problem that high frequency traders use algorithms to detect when a larger 
order is split and re-routed is hard to counteract without hurting the markets. For 
example, regulatory agencies cannot do much without “delaying or reducing the 
dissemination of quotes” (Harris, 2013, p. 7). They best way to solve the bigger problem, 
which is the existence of hunter/seeker algorithms, is to reduce the information about 
order sizes so that algorithms cannot detect them. Markets could report approximate 
order sizes instead of giving the actual order depth. The regulatory agencies can report 
approximate trade sizes through various buckets, or report on aggregated volumes at 
different intervals; incomplete order information together with hidden orders and dark 
pools would substantially reduce the ability for high frequency traders to identify future 
orders or trades (Harris). 
More regulations have been implemented in Europe to regulate high frequency 
trading than have been implemented in America. European countries have different laws 
on how to regulate high frequency trading. So, the EU has standardized the rules that deal 
with high frequency trading through MiFID II. One main difference is that the European 
markets have formally stated what high frequency trading is, whereas the regulatory 
agencies in America have not. Gregoriou (2015) notes that banning high frequency 
trading is not going to solve the problem or help the markets. Pandey and Wu (2015) 
claim that high frequency traders, acting like market makers, should be required to have 
market maker obligations. If high frequency traders were obligated under law to help 
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stabilizing as was the case with market makers, it would take away one of the bigger 
concerns with high frequency trading. 
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CHAPTER VIII: INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND ECONOMIC EFFECT 
If institutional investors do not believe that markets are fair or safe, they will not 
invest in them. And if the institutional investors withdraw from the market, the U.S. 
economy, and potentially the world economy, will suffer. Björn Hagströmer, an 
Associate Professor of Finance at Stockholm University has said that the largest problem 
with high frequency trading is the lack of trust in the markets (Finansliv, 2015). The 
concern of investors is evidenced by the decrease of $232 billion in domestic equity 
mutual funds between May 2010 and January 2012 (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). 
A. GAINS AND LOSES ON HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
Since high frequency traders took over market making roles, they became 
ultimately important for the future success of the exchanges. Since someone has to pay 
for others to receive, the short end of the stick happened to be drawn by large mutual 
funds that invest private working class Americans savings (Patterson, 2012). 
 Needless to say, the internet did not exist when the New York stock exchange 
started in 1792.  At that time, the most convenient way to trade was to have a common 
place to go to trade. The New York Stock Exchange and Wall Street became that place. 
Specialists worked as market makers on the NYSE and were compensated by the spread 
between the buy and ask price. As explained earlier in this thesis, high frequency traders 
have taken over the market making role. Patterson (2012) explains the unfairness with a 
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market maker acting as a middle man, taking part of the average investor’s profits.  In 
today’s society, we are no longer in need of the traditional way of trading in a common 
place, like the New York stock exchange. Today, many purchases are done through 
computers. Market makers may no longer need to match up orders, a computer could do 
it and save the investor money. All that is needed, according to Patterson, is to take out 
the market maker from the equation, and perhaps, the spread would not exist. 
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CONCLUSION 
High frequency trading is a form of algorithmic trading using advanced 
algorithms and rapid speed to receive information and execute trades through co-located 
servers. Even though Arnuk and Saluzzi (2014) note that high frequency trading has 
declined, most likely due to increased competition, high frequency traders still had 50% 
of the market in 2012. High frequency trading has impacted the American and European 
markets tremendously and it paving the way for how future trading within the markets 
will be done.  
Because of the rules implemented by the SEC, such as Reg ATS and Reg NMS, 
high frequency trading has grown and flourished. Through the “transparency” 
implemented by Reg ATS, high frequency traders could detect orders that were 
previously hidden in the markets. Changing from a $1/8 minimum tick size to a 100-point 
decimal system, together with the implementation of Reg NMS, made it cheaper and 
easier for high frequency traders to front run other traders. Through Reg NMS, orders had 
to be routed to the exchange with the best price. So, a large order would most likely have 
to be routed to multiple trading venues, which would lead to high frequency traders 
having more opportunities to front run the order. High frequency traders are able to 
purchase stock at a low price, and then sell if for a penny or so higher, making a profit. 
High frequency traders do this thousands of times per day, earning billions per year. All 
while eating away from hardworking Americans’ retirement funds.  
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High frequency trading, in itself, is not harmful. However, proper regulations 
need to be implemented to deal with the complexity that high frequency trading brings 
with it. The European regulatory agencies have, through MiFID II, come a long way in 
dealing with high frequency trading. Moving forward into the 21st century, high 
frequency trading needs to be constantly monitored and regulations updated, to keep 
markets as efficient and fair as possible.  
 The average American will save for retirement using a 401K plan (or something 
similar). What most of these Americans don’t realize is that part of their retirement 
savings is being eaten up by high frequency traders. The average individual will never 
know that money is missing from his/her savings, because high frequency traders will 
take only a little at a time.  The small “tax” levied by high frequency traders is small 
when it is increasing the price paid by the retirement plan, however, it adds up to a 
substantial amount of lost investment at retirement time.    
High frequency traders are not destroying the markets and it is not dangerous to 
invest your money in the market. High frequency traders will stay in the market and 
operate the same way they currently do if no new regulations are implemented. If no 
more regulations are implemented the glue that hold together our markets might crack. 
Technological advancement in the market should continue to grow and flourish, but it is 
important that they do so within the appropriate framework to support that growth. 
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